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Abstract 
A mechanistic artifact explanation is an explanation that accounts for an artifact behavior by 
describing the underlying mechanism. The article shows that there are different kinds of 
mechanistic artifact explanation: top-down and bottom-up explanation, and I also distinguish 
between less and more inclusive top-down explanations. To illustrate these different kinds of 
explanation, the behavior of a simple, fictional artifact is explained in different ways. I defend 
that which explanation is ideal, depends on pragmatic factors (e.g., the background knowledge of 
the explainee and the specific goal for which the explanation will be used). For each kind of 
explanation, the situations, goals and interests for which it is most appropriate are specified, 
resulting in a pragmatic theory of mechanistic artifact explanation. This theory is compared to 
Jeroen de Ridder’s account of the pragmatics of mechanistic artifact explanation. 
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1. Introduction 
According to Kroes (1998), a technological design is more than a complete description of a 
physical system: it also contains what he calls a technological explanation, i.e. an explanation of 
the function of an artifact in terms of its physical structure. A technological explanation accounts 
for the function of an artifact by referring to the structure (design) of the artifact, the relevant 
physical phenomena, and the actions necessary for the artifact to perform its function. Because 
the function of an artifact cannot be deduced from the explanans of a technological explanation, 
Kroes concludes that a technological explanation does not connect structure and function on the 
basis of a logical deduction, but “on the basis of causal relations and pragmatic rules of actions 
based on these causal relations” (p. 34). 
De Ridder (2006a) considers this notion of technological explanation problematic because he 
does not agree that causal relations and pragmatic rules of action can actually bridge the gap 
between structure and proper function. He thinks the problem with Kroes’ account is that he runs 
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together two projects that should be distinguished: the project of developing an account of proper 
function ascriptions, and the project of explaining how the physicochemical make-up of an 
artifact enables it to perform its function. With respect to the latter project, de Ridder refers to his 
article on mechanistic artifact explanation (de Ridder, 2006b). In a mechanistic artifact 
explanation, one does not explain the function of an artifact, but an artifact behavior. De Ridder 
(2006b) discusses two strategies, top-down and bottom-up, to produce mechanistic artifact 
explanations, and explicates the kinds of contexts in which each strategy is appropriate. These 
contexts are, however, quite general, and need to be specified. We should also identify the goals 
for which top-down and bottom-up explanations are useful. In his Ph.D. dissertation (2007), de 
Ridder offers an account of the different kinds of information that the different strategies 
produce, and uses it to argue for the autonomy of top-down explanation. This account is, 
however, not entirely unproblematic, as we will see below. So a lot of work remains to be done. 
This article offers a theory of mechanistic artifact explanation that deals with these issues, and 
that is inspired by and supplements Weber and Van Bouwel’s work on explanatory pluralism 
(e.g., Van Bouwel & Weber 2002, 2008; Weber & Van Bouwel 2007). A mechanistic artifact 
explanation will here be defined as an explanation that accounts for an artifact behavior by 
describing the underlying mechanism. Following Glennan (2002, p. S344), a mechanism can be 
defined as follows: 
 
A mechanism for a behavior is a complex system that produces that behavior by the 
interaction of a number of parts, where the interactions between parts can be characterized by 
direct, invariant, change-relating generalizations.1 
 
In this article, I show that different mechanistic artifact explanations can be constructed for one 
and the same artifact behavior, and which explanation is most appropriate, depends on pragmatic 
factors such as the goals and background knowledge of the explainee (= the person who asks for 
an explanation).2 The relevant contexts, goals and interests are specified. 
First, let me give an example of a simple mechanism that I will use to illustrate and clarify my 
claims throughout the article. The mechanism is depicted in Figure 1. When one puts a wooden 
box on the left block of the artifact (1), then it slides down the slope until it is on the foot of the 
elevator (2). When one pulls the handle, the box moves up (from 2 to 3), after which it slides 
down the second slope, to finally drop in the cup on the right hand side of the box-moving device 
(4). The explainee does not know what happens within the dotted line. The explainee knows that 
when one puts a box on the left block, and pulls the handle after a while, the box will turn up on 
the right hand side of the artifact, but he does not know the inner workings of the box-moving 
device. However, he is interested in these inner workings, and therefore, he asks for an 
explanation that explains the behavior of the artifact by describing the underlying mechanism of 
this behavior. In other words, he asks for a mechanistic artifact explanation of the transportation 
of the box. 
Section 2 of this article shows that there are at least three different explanations that serve the 
interest of the explainee. In section 3, it is argued that which explanation is most appropriate 
differs from context to context, and depends on pragmatic factors such as the background 
knowledge of the explainee and the specific goal for which the explanation will be used. Based 
on my findings, I develop a general pragmatic account of mechanistic artifact explanation. This 
account is compared to de Ridder’s claims concerning the pragmatics of mechanistic artifact 
explanation in section 4, and I conclude in section 5. 
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2. Top-down and bottom-up 
De Ridder (2006b) distinguishes two strategies to create mechanistic artifact explanations: the 
top-down strategy and the bottom-up strategy. He offers the following definitions: 
 
Top-down strategy: take the behavior to be explained and decompose it into more basic sub-
behaviors, reiterate this step if possible, it should become clear how the complex behavior 
being explained is realized by simpler behaviors in a specific spatiotemporal configuration, 
and for all the sub-behaviors, indicate which component(s) take(s) care of them. 
Bottom-up strategy: name the structural components of the artifact and give information 
about their physicochemical make-up and spatial configuration, show how their 
physicochemical features and configuration result in various behaviors and then describe how 
these behaviors, in their spatiotemporal configuration, together make up the behavior to be 
explained. (de Ridder, 2006b, p. 87)3 
 
Before I illustrate these strategies, it should be noted that whether or not the first step of the top-
down strategy (decompose the behavior into more basic sub-behaviors) can, and thus should, be 
reiterated, is relative to context in de Ridder’s view. We can infer this from the following quote. 
 
It would be absurd if the […] guideline [‘break the function down as fine as possible’] were 
interpreted as requiring that every functional decomposition end in fundamental physics. The 
relevant sense of ‘as fine as possible’ must be more pragmatic. It seems plausible that certain 
sub-behaviors will count as basic or atomic for particular engineering disciplines. Which will 
vary across different fields; where mechanical engineering will accept, say, the strength of a 
particular alloy as given, materials engineering will be interested in how this strength is 
realized by the behaviors of elements in the alloy. (de Ridder, 2007, p. 83) 
 
This implies that which sub-behaviors are not further decomposed in a top-down explanation can 
differ from context to context, and thus, that a top-down explanation can include less or more 
information. 
Let me construct two different top-down explanations of the transportation of the box in the 
box-mover. The first makes abstraction of the forces at work, the second does not. The first top-
down explanation decomposes the transportation of the box into three sub-behaviors: the box’s 
movement from 1 to 2 (see Figure 1) during time interval [t1, t2[, the upward movement of the 
elevator with the transportation of the box to 3 during [t2, t3[, and the box’s movement from 3 to 
4 during [t3, t4[.The first sub-behavior is taken care of by slope A (see Figure 2); the second sub-
behavior is taken care of by elevator system B; and the third sub-behavior is taken care of by 
slope C. This is the first top-down explanation. 
The second top-down explanation includes more information. Just as the first one, it 
decomposes the transportation of the box into three sub-behaviors: the box’s movement from 1 to 
2 during time interval [t1, t2[, the upward movement of the elevator with the transportation of the 
box to 3 during [t2, t3[, and the box’s movement from 3 to 4 during [t3, t4[. But it also decomposes 
each of these behaviors. Slope A causes the box to move from 1 to 2 by reacting to gravitational 
force FG (see Figure 3) with normal force FN, and by reacting to the resultant FR (= FG · sin α) of 
these two forces with a frictional force FF that is smaller than FR, so that the total force F, which 
is parallel to the surface of the ramp and equal to FR – FF, is larger than 0. Because F > 0, the box 
slides down slope A, from 1 to 2. The box’s movement from 2 to 3, and from 3 to 4, can be 
4  
decomposed in similar ways. To reduce the complexity of this article, I do, however, not 
explicate such decompositions here, but they are assumed to be included in the second top-down 
explanation. 
Some may claim that only an explanation such as the second, more extensive top-down 
explanation is a full explanation of the transportation of the box from 1 to 4, and that an 
explanation that does not reveal the forces at work is not a real explanation. I return to this point 
in section 3, showing that the first, more concise top-down explanation can be a complete and 
fully satisfying explanation as well. 
Now consider a bottom-up explanation of the transportation of the box. Such an explanation 
might look as follows. The box is a 0,5 kg oak box. Components D, E and G (see Figure 4) are 
oak blocks that each have a lubricated 30-degree slope. Components F and H are also made of 
oak. The foot of F has a 30-degree slope that is lubricated, and is strongly screwed down the rod, 
which is held upright by the surrounding box. The top of H is a lubricated 30-degree slope with a 
barricade at its end. (Of course, several other features should be added, such as the length, width, 
and height of each component, but I will stop here because summing up all these features is not 
necessary to clarify how a bottom-up explanation might look.) In which behaviors do the 
physicochemical and spatial features of the components of the box-mover result? 
This is revealed in the second part of the bottom-up explanation. Because the ramps in the 
box-mover are constituted by oak components, they do not collapse when a 0,5 kg box is on top 
of them (if the constituting components were made of, say, whipped cream, then the ramps would 
collapse). Instead, they react to the weight FG of the box with normal force FN (see Figure 3). FR 
is the resultant of FG and FN, and is equal to FG · sin α. Since FG = 4,9 N and α = 30°, FR is equal 
to 2,45 N. The box slides down the slope if FR exceeds the friction between the slope and the box 
(FF). In the box-mover, it is guaranteed that FF is smaller than 2,45 N because the slopes and the 
box are lubricated (lubrication reduces friction). As a consequence, the box moves down the 
slopes in the box-mover, from 1 to 2, and from 3 to 4. Because F is made of oak and because the 
foot is strongly screwed down the rod, it is solid enough to carry the weight of the box if the 
handle is pulled. As G is made of oak, it is solid enough to prevent the box from sliding down the 
foot of F as long as it is next to G. Because F can carry the weight of the box, and because G 
prevents the box from sliding down F’s foot, we know that when the box is on the foot of F and 
the handle is pulled, the box moves from 2 to 3. 
So far, I have explicated physicochemical and spatial features of the different components of 
the box-moving device, and I have shown how these features result in various behaviors. One 
thing remains to be done for our bottom-up explanation to be complete: it should be clarified how 
these various behaviors make up the behavior to be explained, that is, the transportation of the 
box. This can easily be done by specifying the temporal organization of the different behaviors. 
The box’s movement from 1 to 2 occurs during time interval [t1, t2[, its movement from 2 to 3 
occurs during [t2, t3[, and its movement from 3 to 4 occurs during [t3, t4[. This organization 
constitutes the transportation of the box from 1 to 4 during [t1, t4[. 
What are the differences between top-down and bottom-up explanation of the transportation of 
the box? A salient difference is the fact that the bottom-up explanation does not only refer to sub-
behaviors of the behavior to be explained and the components taking care of these behaviors, as 
the two top-down explanations do; it also mentions physicochemical and spatial properties of the 
artifact components, while the top-down explanations do not. 
A second difference is that the artifact components to which the top-down explanation refers, 
differ from the artifact components to which the bottom-up explanation refers (compare Figure 2 
to Figure 4; the components are marked out differently). This is due to a difference in 
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perspective. When one uses the top-down strategy, one takes a behavioral or functional 
perspective: one marks out the artifact components on the basis of the sub-behaviors of the 
behavior to be explained. If several pieces contribute to the same behavior, then there is, from a 
functional perspective, a tendency to take them together as one more-piece component. When one 
uses the bottom-up strategy, one takes a structural perspective, which means that one identifies 
the artifact components before one knows what they do. From this perspective, one will typically 
pick out one-piece components; these components cannot be taken together on the basis of the 
behavior to which they contribute because one does not know the relevant behaviors yet. Let me 
call artifact components that are identified from a functional perspective, functional components 
or F-components, and artifact components that are identified from a structural perspective, 
structural components or S-components. Since top-down explanations correspond with a 
functional perspective, they refer to F-components, and since bottom-up explanations correspond 
with a structural perspective, they refer to S-components.4 
3. Pragmatics 
So there are at least three mechanistic artifact explanations of the transportation of the box in 
the box-mover. Does the fact that the bottom-up explanation reveals more about the artifact than 
the top-down explanations imply that the bottom-up explanation is always the best explanation? I 
do not think so. I think that for each explanation, there are contexts in which it is ideal, and that 
which explanation is ideal depends on pragmatic factors such as the background knowledge of 
the explainee and the specific goal for which the explanation will be used. Mechanistic artifact 
explanations are useful in at least two kinds of contexts: the context of use, and the context of 
design. First, let us consider the context of use. 
3.1. Context of use 
If we know the underlying mechanism of the box transportation, then we can draw several 
conclusions about how the box-mover will react to certain manipulations. For instance, we know 
that if we hold the box-mover upside down, it will not display the behavior it is supposed to 
display; and if we pull the handle before the box is on the foot of the elevator, then the box will 
end up under the elevator. We can draw these conclusions from all the mechanistic explanations 
of the box transportation discussed. But some conclusions can only be drawn from the bottom-up 
explanation. For instance, we know that we can drive (metal) screws in the parts of the box-
mover (e.g., for attaching the box-mover to a wooden bottom plate) because we know that these 
parts are made of oak, and not of metal or some other hard material. The fact that the parts are 
made of oak, and not of metal or some other hard material, is only revealed by the bottom-up 
explanation. 
We can draw more conclusions about an artifact from a bottom-up explanation of the behavior 
of this artifact, but this comes with a cost. Suppose we want to draw conclusions that are not only 
relevant to the artifact under consideration, but also to artifacts with other 
physicochemical/spatial properties. We should then make abstraction of the physicochemical and 
spatial properties, and only focus on the factors that the different artifacts have in common. Top-
down explanations do that, contrary to bottom-up explanations, and therefore, the conclusions we 
draw from them are more likely to be relevant for artifacts with other physicochemical/spatial 
properties as well. So while bottom-up explanations are more useful if our goal is to draw as 
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much conclusions as possible about a certain specific artifact, top-down explanations are more 
useful for drawing conclusions that are relevant for as much artifacts as possible. 
But how much information should exactly be included in a top-down explanation? This 
depends on the background knowledge of the explainee. Consider the first top-down explanation 
of the box transportation. Once we know this explanation, we can predict what will happen if we 
turn the box-mover upside down, or if we pull the handle before the box is on the foot of the 
elevator; we do not need the additional information that the second top-down explanation 
provides to make such predictions. This is because we are familiar with falling objects and with 
objects sliding down slopes.  
But sometimes, we want to make predictions concerning situations with which we are not 
familiar. Suppose that, before the first man traveled in space, one wanted to know how the box-
mover would behave in an orbital space station. The explainee could then not be familiar with the 
situation about which he wanted to make a prediction. As a result, the first top-down explanation 
could not help him out: knowing the sub-behaviors of the box transportation on earth, and the 
components taking care of these behaviors, would not be sufficient to predict what would happen 
in space. The explainee would need more information, and such information is provided by the 
second top-down explanation. The second top-down explanation reveals that slope A causes the 
box to move from 1 to 2 by reacting to FG with normal force FN. Since slope A does not react to 
FG with normal force FN in an orbital space station, our explainee could conclude, on the basis of 
the second top-down explanation, that the box would not move from 1 to 2 in the space station. 
After several decades, most people have seen videos, pictures, etc. of objects in orbital space 
stations, and they are familiar with the dispositions of such objects (they float). Given this 
background knowledge, they can predict that the box-mover will not transport boxes in an orbital 
space station as it does on earth, even if they only have the top-down explanation of the box 
transportation; they do not need to know the forces that cause the sub-behaviors of the box 
transportation to have a sense about how the box-mover will behave. This demonstrates that how 
much information is needed to make predictions about how the box-mover will behave in certain 
situations, depends on the explainee’s familiarity with such situations. If he is familiar with such 
situations, the first top-down explanation is most appropriate, as it provides all the information 
needed, and nothing more. But if the explainee is not familiar with such situations, he needs 
additional information, and that information is provided by the second top-down explanation. So 
in that case, the second top-down explanation is most appropriate. 
3.2. Context of design 
Mechanistic artifact explanations are also useful in the context of design. Suppose we want to 
design an artifact that performs the same behavior as some pre-existing artifact. A mechanistic 
artifact explanation of the behavior of the pre-existing artifact can then be very helpful. Suppose 
we want to build a fireproof box-mover that is as flat as possible. Due to the new requirements, 
we do not consider the physicochemical and spatial features of the original box-mover’s 
components to be very relevant for our goal (we cannot just use oak because the box-mover 
should be fireproof, and the slopes should be reconsidered because the box-mover should be as 
flat as possible), and therefore, the explanation should not explicate these physicochemical and 
spatial features. So the bottom-up strategy drops out. What is useful in this context, is to know 
the sub-behaviors of the box transportation and the components taking care of these sub-
behaviors. Such information is very useful for our goal because these sub-behaviors and 
components can be used to realize the box transportation in the new box-mover as well. Although 
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the components of the new box-mover will have different physicochemical and spatial properties, 
it can, just as the original box-mover, transport the box by making it slide down two slopes and 
by using an elevator to transport the box from the first slope to the second. As both top-down 
explanations refer to these sub-behaviors and components, the question becomes: which top-
down explanation is most appropriate? 
This depends, again, on contextual factors. To know the minimal height of the box-mover (it 
should be as flat as possible), one should determine the optimal degree of slope (the lower the 
degree of slope, the flatter one can make the box-mover, but if the degree of slope is too low, the 
box does not slide down anymore). To determine this optimum, the generalizations to which the 
second top-down explanation refers (FR = FG · sin α, and F = FR – FF) are very useful. If the 
material of the box and of the ramp is given, then we can, on the basis of these generalizations, 
determine a minimal degree of slope that guarantees the sliding down of the box. So it seems that 
the second top-down explanation of the box transportation is most useful, and thus most 
appropriate, as it refers, contrary to the first top-down explanation, to generalizations that can 
help us in reaching our goal. This is often the case, but there are also contexts in which the first 
top-down explanation is most appropriate. 
Suppose the explainee has a lot of experience with slopes, and knows, for different 
combinations of materials (e.g., a copper box on a zinc ramp, an aluminum box on a glass ramp, 
etc.), the lowest degree of slope that guarantees the sliding down of the box. Due to this 
background knowledge, the explainee does not need the generalizations to which the second top-
down explanation refers to reach his goal, that is, to make a fireproof box-mover that is as flat as 
possible. The additional information that the second top-down explanation provides would then 
be redundant, and the first top-down explanation would provide all the information needed, and 
thus be ideal in this context. 
It is also possible that the job of the explainee is not to build the new box-mover by himself, 
but to delegate sub-tasks to experts. Once he knows that a box can be transported by making it 
slide down two slopes, and by using an elevator to transport it from the first slope to the second, 
he can give slope experts the assignment of designing the two slopes, and experts in elevator 
systems the assignment of designing the elevator system. No additional information is needed, 
which means that the first top-down explanation is fully satisfying. 
So top-down explanations are often most appropriate for developing an artifact that performs 
the same behavior as a pre-existing artifact, and how much information should exactly be 
included in the top-down explanation can differ from context to context. In still other contexts, 
the most promising explanatory strategy to create an artifact that displays the same behavior as a 
pre-existing artifact, is the bottom-up strategy. This is the case when a description of the 
physicochemical make-up and spatial configuration of the components of the pre-existing artifact 
is a good starting point for the new design. If the current context resembles the context in which 
the pre-existing artifact was designed (same requirements, same material costs, etc.), then a lot of 
physicochemical and spatial features of the components of the original artifact can be used for the 
new artifact as well. In such cases, knowing these features is useful. Because a bottom-up 
explanation explicates them, contrary to top-down explanations, it is more appropriate in such 
cases. 
The first part of a bottom-up explanation (description of the physicochemical make-up and 
spatial configuration of the S-components of the artifact) is a first suggestion on how an artifact 
performing the desired behavior might look. We may, however, still be critical of the 
physicochemical make-up and spatial configuration of the components of the original artifact, 
and ask questions such as ‘Why is the artifact made of the materials it is made of?’ The second 
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and third part of a bottom-up explanation (demonstration of how the physicochemical make-up 
and spatial configuration of the artifact components result in various behaviors and a description 
of how these behaviors result in the behavior to be explained) help one to answer such questions. 
For instance, the bottom-up explanation of the box transportation reveals that the artifact 
components are made of oak in order to be able to carry the weight of the box without collapsing. 
Such information is not only useful to legitimize the physicochemical or spatial property under 
consideration, but it is also relevant if one decides to change it: e.g., given that the components of 
the original box-mover are made of oak in order to be able to carry the weight of the box, we 
know that the new material should be solid enough to carry the weight of the box as well. 
3.3. General claims 
Based on my considerations on (the appropriateness of) the different explanations of the 
transportation of the box in the box-mover, I can develop a more general account of mechanistic 
artifact explanation. We have seen that there are at least two strategies to produce mechanistic 
artifact explanations: top-down and bottom-up. Which strategy is most appropriate depends on 
pragmatic factors. More specifically, it depends on whether or not information about the 
physicochemical make-up and spatial configuration of the artifact components helps the 
explainee reach his goal. When such information is useful, for instance, because the explainee 
wants to draw as much conclusions as possible about the artifact, or because he wants to develop 
a new artifact and the physicochemical and spatial properties of the components of the existing 
artifact form an interesting starting point for this, bottom-up explanation is most appropriate. If 
information about the physicochemical and spatial features is not useful, top-down explanation is 
most appropriate.  This is the case when the explainee wants to draw conclusions that are not 
only relevant for the artifact under consideration, but also for other artifacts, with other 
physicochemical and spatial features, or when only the abstract design, but not the 
physicochemical and spatial features of the artifact components, is relevant for the development 
of a new artifact. 
Furthermore, we have seen that top-down explanations can include more or less information. 
How much information should exactly be included in a top-down explanation depends, again, on 
pragmatic factors, such as the background knowledge of the explainee, and the task for which he 
will use the explanation. The more background knowledge the explainee has, the less explanatory 
information he may need to be able to achieve his goal, and if his job is to delegate sub-tasks to 
experts, he may need less information than when his job is to develop a new artifact all by 
himself. 
3.4. Limitations of mechanistic artifact explanation 
We have seen that there are various goals for which mechanistic artifact explanations are very 
useful. There are, however, also contexts in which non-mechanistic explanations are preferential. 
Suppose that the question ‘Why is the box transported from the one end of the box-mover to the 
other end?’ is not motivated by the interest in the underlying mechanism of this behavior, but by 
the desire to know why the box-mover did not work properly a minute ago, while it does work 
properly at this moment. The explanatory interest in the box transportation can then be motivated 
by the desire to know what has changed. An explanation that perfectly serves this interest is: the 
box is transported because someone repaired the handle of the box-mover, which was broken a 
minute ago. This is not a mechanistic artifact explanation as it does not explicate any mechanism, 
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and it outperforms the aforementioned mechanistic artifact explanations because it reveals what 
has changed during the time interval under consideration, while the mechanistic artifact 
explanations do not. 
So it is wrong to think that offering a good explanation of an artifact behavior means offering 
a mechanistic explanation of this behavior. Although mechanistic artifact explanations can serve 
various goals, there are also goals that they do not serve, such as the desire to know what changed 
during a certain time interval (also see De Winter, 2010). For these goals, mechanistic artifact 
explanations are bad explanations. 
4. Comparison with de Ridder’s account 
Now, let me compare my pragmatic account of mechanistic artifact explanation to Jeroen de 
Ridder’s account of the pragmatics of mechanistic artifact explanation. The latter account can be 
divided in two parts: (1) some remarks de Ridder (2006b) makes on the kinds of contexts in 
which bottom-up explanations and top-down explanations are useful, and (2) a pragmatic 
argument for the autonomy of top-down explanations developed in de Ridder (2007). Let us start 
with the first part. 
According to de Ridder (2006b), bottom-up explanations provide structural understanding, 
which “shows one exactly how a particular mechanism implements a piece of behavior” (p. 95). 
Such understanding is highly useful in engineering contexts because “it differentiates between the 
detailed implementation choices to be made in figuring out the details of a new design” (p. 95). 
Top-down explanation, on the other hand, provide behavioral understanding, which “exhibits 
how a particular complex behavior can be created out of simpler behaviors, independent of the 
particular realization of these behaviors” (p. 95). De Ridder considers such understanding to be 
useful in early stages of engineering design, when the engineer is reflecting on how a complex 
artifact behavior can be constituted by simpler sub-behaviors, without worrying (yet) about how 
to realize these sub-behaviors. Top-down explanations are, according to de Ridder, also very 
useful in a lot of everyday contexts, because “[i]n most everyday contexts […], people are not 
interested in the gory details, but only need a rough behavioral understanding of how a complex 
behavior is produced” (p. 89). 
There are at least four respects in which my account is more sophisticated. Firstly, it identifies 
some specific goals for which mechanistic artifact explanations are useful: the goal of drawing 
conclusions about the use of the artifact, the goal of designing an artifact that performs the same 
behavior as the artifact of which the behavior is explained, and the goal of delegating sub-tasks of 
designing such an artifact to the right experts. Secondly, it specifies the kinds of engineering 
contexts in which bottom-up explanation is most appropriate: design contexts in which the 
physicochemical and spatial features of the components of the existing artifact form an 
interesting starting point for the new design. If these features are irrelevant for the new design 
(because the components of the new artifact should have different physicochemical and spatial 
features due to new design requirements), top-down explanation is most appropriate. Thirdly, I 
have shown that bottom-up explanations are not only useful in engineering contexts, but that they 
can also be useful in contexts of use; bottom-up explanations are most useful if the goal is to 
draw as much conclusions as possible about the use of the artifact. Fourthly, I have identified two 
pragmatic factors on which the amount of information that should be included in a top-down 
explanation depends: the background knowledge of the explainee and his specific task. 
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Now consider the second part of de Ridder’s account of the pragmatics of mechanistic artifact 
explanation: his pragmatic argument for the autonomy of top-down explanations. According to 
the pragmatic argument, top-down explanations are more appropriate when one is interested in 
comparative information. Comparative information shows how the realization of the behavior to 
be explained is similar to other possible realizations of the same behavior. Because the factors to 
which top-down explanations refer, are not only characteristic of the realization of the behavior to 
be explained in the artifact under consideration, but also of the realization of this behavior in 
artifacts with other physicochemical/spatial features (as long as the artifact components perform 
the same sub-behaviors), top-down explanations are more appropriate if one is interested in 
comparative information. Because bottom-up explanations do not make abstraction of the 
physicochemical make-up and spatial configuration of the artifact components, they are, 
according to de Ridder, less appropriate for the interest in comparative information. But they are 
more appropriate if one is interested in contrastive information, i.e. information that shows how 
the realization of the behavior to be explained differs from other possible states of affairs. By 
explicating physicochemical and spatial features, bottom-up explanations focus on factors that 
are unique for the realization of the behavior to be explained in the artifact under consideration. 
These factors distinguish the realization of the behavior to be explained in the artifact under 
consideration from other possible ways to realize this behavior. 
De Ridder also considers top-down explanations more appropriate than bottom-up 
explanations for the interest in counterfactual information, that is, the interest in factors that make 
a difference with respect to the occurrence of the behavior to be explained.5 Changing one of the 
physicochemical or spatial properties will often not make a difference with respect to the 
occurrence of the behavior to be explained (suppose the box-mover is made of plastic instead of 
being made of oak), while changing one of the sub-behaviors of this behavior will make a 
difference. Since bottom-up explanations describe the artifact components’ physicochemical and 
spatial features, while top-down explanations only focus on sub-behaviors, de Ridder (2007, p. 
187) concludes that the top-down strategy “does a better job at suggesting the right kinds of 
counterfactuals”. 
So de Ridder claims (1) that top-down explanation is more appropriate if the explainee is 
interested in comparative information, while bottom-up explanation is more appropriate if the 
explainee is interested in contrastive information, and (2) that top-down explanation is more 
appropriate if the explainee is interested in counterfactual information. I agree with both claims, 
but I reject de Ridder’s argument in favor of (2); I have a different reason for accepting (2). 
De Ridder’s (2007, p. 185) argument in favor of (2) is that while the top-down strategy 
“suggests the right kinds of counterfactuals”, the bottom-up strategy “incorrectly suggests that 
the spatial and physicochemical properties in their categorical descriptions make a crucial 
difference to the artifact’s overall behavior.” This is not correct. Consider the bottom-up 
explanation of the transportation of the box. This explanation includes a lot of counterfactual 
information. Just as the two top-down explanations of the box transportation, it refers to sub-
behaviors that are crucial for the overall behavior. It also reveals factors that make a difference 
with respect to these sub-behaviors. For instance, the generalization “the box slides down a slope 
in the box-mover if FR > FF (see Figure 3)” reveals a factor that makes a difference with respect 
to the sliding down of the box:  “FR > FF”. This factor is difference-making because we can 
prevent the box from sliding down the slope by eliminating this factor (by manipulating FR or FF 
so that FR = FF). Another generalization included in the bottom-up explanation is “FR = FG · sin 
α”. This generalization points to factors that make a difference with respect to FR: FG and α. FG 
and α are difference-making because we can change the value of FR by changing the value of FG 
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or of α. I could go on, but the point is that the bottom-up explanation picks out the factors that 
make a difference. More generally, we can say that, just as top-down explanations, bottom-up 
explanations offer a lot of counterfactual information. Of course, bottom-up explanations also 
refer to physicochemical and spatial features, which usually do not make a crucial difference, but, 
contrary to what de Ridder claims, bottom-up explanations do not suggest that they do. For 
instance, the bottom-up explanation of the box transportation does not suggest that the fact that 
the components of the box-mover are made of oak is crucial for the overall behavior of the box-
mover, but only that it is relevant for this behavior. 
Why, then, is top-down explanation more appropriate for the interest in counterfactual 
information than bottom-up explanation? To answer this question, we can use the three criteria 
suggested by Van Bouwel and Weber (2008, p. 175) to compare alternative explanations: their 
accuracy (correctness, that is, their relation with reality), their adequacy (their relation to what the 
explainee expects from the explanation, to the purpose of the explanation) and their efficiency 
(the amount of work that is needed to construct the explanation). Suppose that someone seeks a 
mechanistic artifact explanation of an artifact behavior and that he is interested in counterfactual 
information. Consider two explanations, a top-down and a bottom-up explanation, which are 
equally correct, and which both provide all the counterfactual information needed. The two 
explanations are then equally accurate and equally adequate. But the top-down explanation 
outperforms the bottom-up explanation with respect to efficiency, that is, its construction requires 
less work. This is because not only counterfactual information should be included in the bottom-
up explanation, but also a lot of information about the artifact components’ physicochemical 
make-up and their spatial configuration. Such information should not be included in the top-down 
explanation, so that less effort is required to construct it. Because the top-down explanation is 
more efficient than the bottom-up explanation, while being equally accurate and adequate, it is 
more appropriate in the context under consideration, that is, a context in which the explainee is 
interested in counterfactual information. 
5. Conclusion 
The general outline of my pragmatic account of mechanistic artifact explanation is this. If we 
want to explain an artifact behavior by the underlying mechanism of this behavior, that is, if we 
want to construct a mechanistic artifact explanation, then this can often be done in more than one 
way. Which mechanistic artifact explanation is most appropriate depends on pragmatic factors, 
such as the goal of the explainee and his background knowledge. The reason is that these factors 
determine which information is useful for the explainee, and thus, which information should be 
included in the explanation and which not. 
Following Jeroen de Ridder, I have distinguished between bottom-up and top-down 
explanation, and between less and more inclusive top-down explanations. We should not think of 
one of these kinds of explanation as the real/best characterization of mechanistic artifact 
explanation. Each kind is, in my opinion, a genuine characterization of a class of mechanistic 
artifact explanations, and which kind is ideal can differ from context to context. For each kind of 
explanation, I have specified contexts, goals and interests for which it is more and less 
appropriate, resulting in a pragmatic account of mechanistic artifact explanation that is more 
sophisticated than de Ridder’s account of the pragmatics of mechanistic artifact explanation. 
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Endnotes
                                                 
1
 I use Glennan’s (2002) definition of mechanisms because I agree with de Ridder (2006b, p. 92) that it captures a 
number of important aspects of mechanisms, and because I see no reason to reject this definition. De Ridder does 
formulate some criticisms on Glennan (2002), but these focus on Glennan’s characterization of a mechanical model, 
and not on his notion of a mechanism. 
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2
 This corresponds with Pitt’s (2009) account of technological explanation. According to Pitt, which explanation 
should be offered, depends on the audience for whom the explanation is meant, on what would satisfy them, and on 
the specific why- and/or how-questions the explanation is supposed to answer. 
3
 Similar explanatory strategies are presented in Bechtel & Richardson (1993, p. 18). The top-down strategy is 
Bechtel & Richardson’s synthetic strategy applied to an artifact. The bottom-up strategy, on the other hand, is not 
entirely the same as Bechtel & Richardson’s synthetic strategy applied to an artifact. The difference is that the 
bottom-up strategy includes giving information about the physicochemical make-up of the components, while the 
synthetic strategy does not. Cummins (1975) also presents two explanatory strategies, the analytical strategy and the 
subsumption strategy, that are similar to, respectively, the top-down and the bottom-up strategy. For the differences 
between Cummins’s explanatory strategies on the one hand, and the top-down and bottom-up strategy on the other 
hand, see de Ridder (2006b, p. 87n). 
4
 I do not assume that F- and S-components are necessarily different, because often, they are not. My point is that in 
a top-down explanation, we can be sure that the components referred to are F-components, while it is not guaranteed 
that they are also S-components. In a bottom-up explanation, the components referred to are necessarily S-
components, but they are not necessarily F-components. 
5
 For counterfactual accounts of causation, see, e.g., Lewis (1973) and Woodward (2000, 2002). 
Figures 
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Figure captions 
Figure 1. Simple mechanism. 
Figure 2. Artifact components to which the top-down explanation refers. 
Figure 3. Forces exerted on a box on a slope. 
Figure 4. Artifact components to which the bottom-up explanation refers. 
